A Philosopher's Blog

10 Years Later

Posted in Business, Environment, Ethics, Law, Medicine/Health, Philosophy, Politics by Michael LaBossiere on September 11, 2011
Sanjay Gupta

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Today is the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attack. It is, obviously enough, fitting to look back on that terrible day and reflect upon it and its ramifications.

One matter that is of special importance is the fact that the 9/11 responders seem to be suffering from an unusual high level of health complications. Given that they were exposed to burning materials and various other hazards, this is hardly shocking. What is, however, rather shocking is the fact that it took congress nearly a decade to work out a health care bill for the first responders. What is rather disturbing is that Senator Tom Coburn, a Republican, said he would block the bill. He gave two reasons. First, he wanted it to be funded through spending cuts. Second, he claimed that the bill had not gone through the proper committee process. His second reason was also backed by fellow Republican Mike Enzi.

In regards to the first reason, it struck me as rather sad that after Republicans had “wrapped” themselves in 9/11 and spent billions on “homeland security” and two wars, a major Republican would do such a thing. While I do understand the need to be fiscally responsible, suddenly finding this fiscal faith when it comes to the 9/11 responders seems rather morally questionable. Surely those people earned the right by their sacrifices. To support this, one needs merely to turn to the speeches in which the Republicans spoke of 9/11 and the heroism of the first responders.

In regards to the second reason, Coburn actually missed the committee meeting in question (and he was a member of the committee). Hence, his complaint was spurious.  While following due process is important (although it was often bypassed in the name of national security), it seems rather petty and mean of him to have used such a point to try to delay or block the bill.

While the bill eventually passed, there were some significant changes. First, the money allocated to the bill was reduced. Apparently the new found sense of fiscal responsibility arrived to late to prevent the massive spending under Bush but just in time to cut back spending on health care for the first responders (who had been praised as great heroes by the very folks who insisted on cutting the budget). Second, the Victims Compensation Fund was set to close significantly earlier and  various other limitations were set.

Coburn justified his actions  (after acknowledging the heroism of the first responders) by claiming that they prevented the bill from “robbing future generations of opportunity.” On the one hand, Coburn does have a point: spending should be carefully reviewed to ensure that the need is legitimate and that the cost will not be too burdensome. Oddly enough, this rather laudable principle seems to be generally overlooked in other cases. In regards to spending on the war on terror, there seems to have been little concern paid to determining whether the spending would be effective (generally not) and whether or not it would burden future generations (definitely so). The main justification given for funding the war on terror is that doing so saves lives. However, terrorism is rather unlikely cause of death for Americans. Except, of course, for the 9/11 responders who became sick because of their exposure to a devil’s cocktail of toxins. There is a certain irony in a congress that funds x-ray machines for full body scans to “protect” us against the minute chance that someone will try to smuggle a bomb on a flight in his underwear (again) yet balks at medical care for people who are, in fact, in danger from the actions of terrorists. Of course, helping the first responders does not, in general, funnel money to the folks who help fund the re-election of politicians.

A final point of concern is that the bill leaves out coverage of cancer. While we went to war in Iraq without checking the facts, folks in congress claimed that a causal link had not been established between the exposure on 9/11 and the cancers that are appearing in the responders. After all, if these people did not get their cancer from 9/11, then there would be no reason for the taxpayers to foot the bill for their care.

One obvious response is that even if the cancer was not caused by their exposure during the 9/11 events, these people should simply be given the benefit of the doubt. After all, treating sick or dying people who put their lives on the line for others hardly seems to be a waste of money. If arguments are needed for how important this event was and how great these people are, one can merely look at what the Republicans said about them, at least prior to the debate over the bill.

A second reply is that it seems reasonable to believe that being exposed to that devil’s cocktail of toxins that arose from the wreckage could very well cause cancer. There is also the fact that the 9/11 responders seem to suffer from cancer at a higher than expected rate. Of course, given that our understanding of cancer is limited, there are grounds for “cancer skepticism” (which has been fueled by the tobacco and other industries). I suspect that one reason that congress has been reluctant to provide coverage for cancer in this case is that doing so would seem to admit that the various chemicals and toxins the responders were exposed to do cause cancer. This would, obviously enough, present various liability problems and could also be used in backing up stronger regulations regarding pollutants. This sort of result would not, of course, please the corporations who donate so lavishly to re-election funds. Then again, perhaps it is just about saving money by not paying for cancer treatments.

A third reply is that there does seem to be a causal link. Sanjay Gupta has been investigating this and reports what he has learned in “Terror in the Dust.” If such a link has been established, then the 9/11 responders should receive coverage for cancer. After all, this would show that at least some of their cancers were caused by the events of 9/11 and that would seem to warrant the state picking up the  tab. At the very least, the Republicans owe them for years of using them for political purposes (the Democrats too, only to a lesser extent).

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DADT Repealed

Posted in Ethics, Philosophy, Politics by Michael LaBossiere on December 23, 2010
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Badge
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The infamous Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy was recently repealed.

As has often been argued, the policy was rather  questionable. After all, it seemed to say that it was okay for homosexuals to serve provided that they did so secretly. This seems to imply that what mattered was not someone’s sexual orientation but what other people happened to know about that orientation.  Of course, the “don’t ask” policy seems to have often been ignored and when confronted, military personal were supposed to tell. As such, it seemed like a rather weird sort of policy that needed to be fixed.

While some folks worked hard trying to repeal it, others worked hard to try to stall and prevent the repeal. Most famously, John McCain fought an impressively dogged defense against it (in many cases, fighting against his previous self): each time one of his conditions (such as endorsement by the Joint Chiefs) was met, he would insist on another (such as a survey). Even when all his conditions were met, he still opposed the change. However, his opposition failed and it was repealed.

As I see it, this is a good thing. The top officers and most personal seem to be fine with the situation. Also, nations that have allowed homosexuals to serve do not seem to have run into any problems specific to this factor. In fact, lifting such restrictions seems to be beneficial. See, for example, the Palm Center report on this matter. Naturally, the report can be challenged. However, doing so would seem to require presenting cases in which allowing homosexuals to serve openly was a significant causal factor in creating problems to military effectiveness. Naturally, these cases would have to be properly compared to comparable cases involving heterosexuals to determine if the cause was specific to homosexuality or due to another factor. However, the most reasonable argument against the repeal (that it would impair military effectiveness) seems to have been soundly defeated. As such, the repeal seems reasonable.

Also,  if someone wishes to serve his/her country and can make such a contribution, then it would seem both wrong and wasteful to deny him/her that chance on the basis of sexual orientation. We do not, it would seem, have the luxury of prejudice, what with Iraq, Afghanistan, the endless war on terror, and with possible future conflicts with Iran and North Korea.

Naturally, if the future shows that repealing DaDT has damaged our military due to some factors that did not affect any other military, then a change should be strongly  considered. After all, the military cannot (as many would argue) afford the luxury of equality at the expense of its core mission.

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Terrorism & Citizenship

Posted in Ethics, Law, Politics by Michael LaBossiere on May 8, 2010
FBI mugshot of Timothy McVeigh.
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In addition to the fear they create, terrorist incidents also give politicians the opportunity to try to score political points. Or, to be even more cynical, to take steps to further erode individual rights and expand the power of the state.

Lieberman and Brown have recently proposed that an American who is suspected of being allied with terrorists can have his citizenship removed. Interestingly, some Democrats seem to be trying to cash in by supporting this proposal while some Republicans are opposed to it.

From a legal standpoint, this seems to be on shaky grounds, at best. As it now stands, the Supreme Court’s last ruling is fairly clear that a citizen cannot be involuntarily stripped of citizenship. This does not mean that citizens can do anything and retain their citizenship. This is because some actions would count as voluntarily relinquishing citizenship.

In the case of this particular proposal, the fatal flaw is that it allows American citizens to be stripped of their citizenship merely by being suspects. Presumably part of the intent of this law is to remove the protections that citizens enjoy, thus allowing suspects to subject to treatment that would normally violate American law. While this prospect is appealing to some, this is unacceptable on two grounds.  First, it violates the presumption of innocence and  due process. Stripping a person of his citizenship on the basis of his being a suspect presumes the person is guilty and inflicts a punishment prior to any trial. This is on par with determining and applying a sentence before the trial has even begun. Second, it would set a precedent that could be used to erode rights in other areas. For example, if citizens can be stripped of their citizenship for being suspects in such cases, it would make it easier to argue that people suspected of terrible crimes should also be stripped of certain rights. While it would be a slippery slope to assume that the passing of such a law would send us instantly into such circumstances, it does seem reasonable to be concerned that this would be a major step down such a path.

In reply, it might be argued that people who are allied with terrorists should be regarded as traitors and be stripped of their citizenship. Even if this is assumed to be true, it does not follow that suspects should be treated this way. To use an analogy, it is true that rapists should be severely punished. However, it does not follow that people who are suspected of rape should be punished. After all, a suspect could be innocent. That is why we are supposed to determine guilt before actually inflicting punishments.

It might then be argued that such suspects are different from all other suspects in a way that justifies this treatment. However, the burden of proof rests on those who make this claim. After all, child molesters, serial killers, domestic terrorists (like Timothy McVeigh), rapists, and mass murderers do not lose their rights when they become suspects. As such, it is not the horribleness of the alleged crime that would justify a difference in treatment.

The most obvious difference is that while serial killers, crime lords, and serial rapists are hurting Americans, they are not rejecting America. While these people might be public enemies, they are not enemies of the state in that they are not allying themselves with foreign enemies. However, it is not clear why this difference would justify stripping a suspect in a terror case of his citizenship. After all, as noted above, the suspect is still just a suspect. In addition, domestic terrorists (like McVeigh) have not been stripped of their citizenship even when they explicitly reject and attack the United States government.  Perhaps a case can be made as to why a citizen who has been proven to have allied himself with an enemy of the state should be stripped of citizenship, but this is quite a different matter than justifying stripping a mere suspect of his citizenship.

It might also be argued that citizens who are suspected of being allied with terrorists must be stripped of their citizenship so they can be “questioned” in ways that American citizens cannot. Presumably this would be justified on the grounds that the good consequences (presumably getting data about terrorists) outweigh the bad (grossly violating the Constitution). Of course, this same logic can be used in any case involving serious consequences. This would, of course, entail the destruction of some of the basic foundations of our legal system. This would, it seems, be worse that allowing suspects to retain their citizenship.

My considered view is that this proposal is unacceptable and should not become law.

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