Drones to Your Door
(Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In a clever move to grab media attention on Cyber-Monday, Amazon announced its plans to develop drone delivery. The United States has, of course, been leading the world in delivery via drone, although we have mostly been delivering missiles Amazon proposes to make drones a much more welcome site—they will be bringers of what you want, rather than bringers of death.
On the face of it, drone delivery is certainly possible. After all, the basic technology already exists and Amazon has deep pockets and political influence. However, the drone delivery system does face some challenges.
One obvious practical challenge is getting the drones to safely and reliably travel from their launch sites to the delivery site and then back. Doing this will require that the drones avoid hitting things like towers, trees, power lines, other aircraft, birds and people. While the drones are probably going to be relatively small and slow moving (compared to the military drones made famous in Afghanistan and Pakistan), a drone could damage property and injure animals and people. However, there seem to be no compelling reason to believe that a drone could not operate as safely as a delivery truck, which is a reasonable standard for drone operations. This will probably require special drone routes that are well clear of conventional airspace and perhaps specialized landing spots for drone deliveries. After all, having a drone just plop down at someone’s front door could be very problematic.
Another obvious practical challenge is the fact that people will interfere with the drones. In some cases, people (mostly kids) will try to catch or knock down the drones for the malicious fun of it. In most cases people will be trying to hijack the drones in order to steal their cargoes. This interference might be done by technological means such as trying to jam the drone or even take control of the drone. Naturally, people will also resort to lower tech methods, such as hitting them with thrown (or shot) objects.
Because of the threats presented by people, Amazon will need to ensure that their drones are protected from jamming and hacking. They will also need to find ways to deter people from attacking the drones. While people are usually reluctant to attack a human delivery driver, the threshold for willingness to go after a drone is certainly lower. One obvious option is to equip the drones with cameras that record the area around the drone, thus enabling videos of thefts and attacks to be sent to the police. This option does, of course, raise moral concerns about drones flying about cities recording from on high. After all, the drones will have a vantage point that will allow them to see into fenced yards and in other areas where people normally expect privacy. Amazon could handle this by erasing the recordings of the drones if no incident takes place or by limiting access to the drone recordings to the police. Of course, it seems likely that police and security organizations might very much want access to the drone recordings—it might turn out that the NSA will use the Amazon drones like they now use our phones—just another tool for the police state.
In addition to the moral concern about spying, there is also a minor moral concern about the fact that drones provide such rapid delivery. In some cases, this could be an important service—a person could, for example, get a critical part needed for their business or car (perhaps delivered right to the car). In other cases, this could simply be yet another way for people to fail in the virtue of patience.
As to the question of whether or not I will use it, the answer is probably “yes”—if only once and only to see that drone touching down in my driveway, chopping up wayward squirrels into chunks with its whirling blades.
Down With Tyrants?
“Ruins in Richmond” Damage to Richmond, Virginia from the American Civil War. Albumen print. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In the days of my youth, I grew up reading about heroes who brought the villains down and dispensed justice with their fists or guns. While not all of us buy into the American heroic mythology, I suspect that many of us had our views shaped as mine were shaped.
One part of the American heroic mythology is that tyrants are not to be tolerated. It matters not if the tyrant is great or petty, an evil sheriff or wicked king—they are all to be brought to justice (preferably cruel justice) by the hero. Because of the shaping heroes of my youth, I certainly favor taking down tyrants. Ride in. Bang! Bang! Save the day. Hi, ho Silver and away!
Of course, many years have passed since those early days of comic books and silver screens and my view of heroics has been tempered by some measure of wisdom and a larger measure of time. While I do find tyrants morally appalling, I have learned that the world is a complicated place and that attempts to save the day rarely work out as it does in fiction.
In the case of Syria, the Assad government is clearly an evil government—the state is oppressive and has been rather busy killing people to stay in power. As such, this is a classic bad-guy situation, seemingly begging for a bang-bang solution. The same was, of course, supposed to be true of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
In Iraq, the United States and a few allies rode in, shot things up and ousted Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, that movie spawned a seemingly endless series of sequels, each turning out rather badly and having a high body count. We did not ride off into the sunset—we were stuck there for years and, in many ways, are still stuck.
In the case of Afghanistan, we rode in, shot things up, and then stayed. And stayed. And stayed. The sequels, as in Iraq, featured plenty of violence and high body counts. We are still there, despite many sunsets.
Now the United States is considering military action against Syria. On the one hand, it is clear that the regime has done and is doing bad things. As such, it makes sense to consider that there is a moral obligation to prevent the Syrian government from continuing to engage in the killing and perhaps even a moral obligation to oust the current regime. In an action movie, a rag-tag band of diverse heroes would ride in, defeat Assad (saying something like it “looks like we kicked Ass…ad”) and ride out with some suitable pop rock song jamming in the background. However, this is not an action movie.
So, on the other hand, there is the rather important moral and practical concern about what impact our military actions would have. If our involvement is predicated on a moral imperative, then we would seem morally obligated to consider the ethics of our actions in terms of the consequences. As I have noted before, while the Assad regime is rather bad, it might be the least worst of the practical options. If our attacks have a significant impact and Assad is toppled, then it seems that the likely results would either be continued chaos as the various factions settle who will be the new tyrant or the emergence of a radical state. The chances of having a stable, pro-West (or even neutral), effective state result from United States intervention seem to be incredibly low. While tyranny is bad, one could follow Hobbes and contend that a tyrant is better than chaos.
Also of moral concern is the matter of self-determination. In our own civil war, the United States made it clear that the matter was an internal one—despite the fact that we were rather busy slaughtering each other and destroying our cities. Moral consistency would seem to require that the same policy be adopted for Syria. It could be noted that the Syria government is behaving in a morally relevant difference. That is, the American civil war was a legitimate military struggle that did not morally warrant external intervention while the Syrian civil war does warrant external intervention. Part of the case for the distinction could be the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war. Another part of the case could be the fact that the Syrian conflict is more indiscriminate than the American civil war.
While tyrants should be brought down, the matter is a rather complicated one. Which is rather unfortunate.
Motives for Terror
(Photo credit: Wikipedia)
After the evil and senseless bombing in Boston, there was considerable speculation about the motives of the bombers. Not surprisingly, some folks blamed their preferred demons: some on the left leaped to conclusions involving right-wingers while those on the right leaped to conclusions involving Islam. As it turns out, the alleged murderers have a connection to Islam.
While some hold the view that there is a strong causal connection between being a Muslim and being a terrorist, the connection obviously cannot be that strong. After all, the vast majority of Muslims do not engage in terrorism. As such, beginning and ending the discussion of the motive for terror with Islam is not adequate.
When it comes to terrorist attacks against the United States, the stock explanation is that the terrorists are motivated by a hatred of our freedom. A common variation on that is that they hate democracy. Another explanation is that they simply hate the United States and other countries.
The explanation that terrorists are motivated by a hatred of our freedom (or democracy) does two main things. The first is that it casts the terrorists as enemies of freedom and democracy, thus presenting them as having evil motives. The second is that it casts the United States and its allies as being attacked because of their virtues. Crudely put, the bad guys are attacking us because they hate what is good.
The explanation that the terrorists simply hate the United States and its allies also does two main things. The first is that it casts the terrorists as simply being haters without any justification for their hate. The second is that it casts the United States and its allies as innocent targets. Crudely put, the haters are attacking us because they are haters.
In both of these approaches, the United States and its allies are presented as innocent victims who are being attacked for wicked or irrational reasons. What certainly helps support this narrative is that the terrorists engage in acts that are wicked and certainly seem irrational. After all, the people who are killed and injured are usually just random innocents who simply happen to be in the blast area at the time. Because of this, it is correct to condemn such terrorists as morally wicked on the grounds that they engage in indiscriminate violence. However, the fact that the direct victims of the terrorists are generally innocent victims of wicked deeds does not entail that the terrorists are motivated to attack innocent countries because they hate us, our freedom or our democracy.
One significant source of evidence regarding the motivation of terrorists is the statements terrorists make regarding their own reasons. In the case of the alleged Boston bomber, he claims that he was motivated by the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of other terrorists, they have generally claimed they are motivated by the actions of the United States and its allies.
My point here is not to justify the actions of the terrorists. Rather, the point is that the terrorists do not claim to be motivated by the reasons that have been attributed to them. That is, they do not regard themselves as being driven to attack us because they hate our freedom or democracy. They do often claim to hate us, but for rather specific reasons involving our foreign policy. As such, these stock explanations seem to be in error.
It might be countered that the terrorists are lying about their motivations. That is, that they are really driven by a hatred of our freedom or democracy and are just claiming that they are motivated by our foreign policy and associated actions (like invading countries and assassinating people with drones) for some devious reason.
The obvious reply to this is that if terrorists were motivated by a hatred of freedom or democracy, they would presumably attack countries based on their degree of freedom or democracy. Also, a non-stupid terrorist would take into account the ease of attacking a country and what the country could and would do in response. Hitting the United States to strike against freedom or democracy would thus be a poor choice, given our capabilities and how we respond to such attacks (invasions, drone strikes and so on). To use an analogy, if someone hated athletes, it would not be very sensible to get into a fist fight with a professional mixed martial artist when one could go beat up a marathon runner (who is not also a martial artist).
It might be countered that the United States is the symbol for freedom and democracy, hence the terrorists want to attack the United States even though they know that this will result in retaliation of the sort that many other democratic states cannot or would not engage in.
While this is not impossible, the more plausible explanation is that the terrorists are motivated by their hatred of our foreign policy. After all, invasions, assassinations and such tend to motivate people to engage in violence far more so than some sort of hatred of freedom or democracy.
It might, of course, be wondered why the motivation of terrorists matter. What matters is not why they try to murder people at a marathon but that they try to do such things.
While what they do obviously matters, why they do it also matters. While I obviously believe that terrorism of the sort that took place in Boston is evil, this does not entail that there are no legitimate grievances against the United States and its allies in regards to our foreign policies. To use an analogy, if Bob blows up Sam’s whole family because Sam killed Bob’s son, then Bob has acted wrongly. But this does not prove that Sam acted rightly in killing Bob’s son. In the case of the United States, the fact that we have been attacked by terrorists does not thus make our invasions or drone assassinations right. Now, it might turn out that our actions are right, but we cannot infer that they are just because terrorists do terrible things.
Sorting out what motivates terrorists is also rather useful in trying to prevent terrorism. If we assume they are motivated by their hatred of our freedom or democracy, then we would have to abandon our freedom or democracy to remove their motivation. This is obviously something that should not be done.
However, if some terrorists are motivated by specific aspects of our foreign policy (such as drone strikes that kill civilians), then it seems well worth considering whether we should change these policies. To use an analogy, if someone keeps trying to attack me because I am virtuous, then I obviously should not abandon my virtues just to stop these attacks. But if someone keeps trying to attack me because I keep provoking him, then I should consider whether or not I should be doing those things. It might turn out that I am in the right, but it might turn out that I am in the wrong. If I am in the wrong, then I should change. But if he is in the wrong, then I would be warranted in not changing (but I would need to be honest about why he is attacking me). For example, if he goes after me because I am stealing his newspaper and dumping leaves in his yard, then I should probably stop doing that. As another example, if he is going after me because I run past his house, then he should stop doing that.
The same would seem to apply to terrorists. If we are engaged in unjust actions that provoke people, then we should stop those actions. If, however, we are acting justly and this provokes people, then we should continue to the degree those actions are warranted and necessary. But we should be honest about why they area attacking us.
Racism, Sexism & Military Service
(Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In a previous essay I discussed the matter of women in combat. While the decision has been made to permit women to serve in combat (which mainly just makes policy reflect reality), there are still those who argue against allowing women in these roles.
Obviously, this is not the first time that there has been a dispute regarding whether or not certain types of people are fit for certain types of military service (if at all). Equally obviously, this rather long history of exclusion and later inclusion provides a means of assessing the potential impact of allowing women to serve in combat roles.
While blacks served in American military conflicts since the Revolution, the official policy until 1948 was that blacks would serve in their own units (usually commanded by white officers). There were also arguments that blacks were simply unfit to serve in the military because of alleged defects in their abilities and character (this method of appealing to stereotypes has become a stock method in this context). Even after blacks had served with distinction in wars, this view still held. After all, prejudice is generally never defeated by clear and obvious evidence against it.
While the idea that blacks could serve in the military was eventually accepted, the idea of integrating the armed forces was resisted. One argument given against integration rested on the claim that allowing blacks to serve with whites would be harmful to moral and damage unit cohesion. Some even claimed that it would destroy the military (and perhaps America). This argument from cohesion, like the appeal to stereotypes, also became a stock tool.
The United States Navy started integrating crews in 1946 and President Truman ordered integration in 1948. In the 1950s the Korean War forced the ground forces to integrate because of casualties: all-white units needed replacements and black soldiers were on hand.
Despite the dire predictions, the integration of whites and blacks in the military went fairly smoothly and the military’s effectiveness was not (as some feared) damaged by this.
In more recent history, there was considerable uproar over the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding homosexuals in the military. Although soldiers could be expelled for being homosexuals, this policy of intentional deceit did allow homosexuals to serve as long as no one asked and no one told (although people generally knew).
Even more recently, the decision was made to allow homosexuals to serve openly. Naturally, the stock arguments involving stereotypes and unit cohesion were brought into play and doom was predicted once more.
Interestingly enough, this doom did not come to pass. Unit cohesion seemed to remain unaffected by the change of policy and the efficacy of the military remained intact.
Most recently, the hue and cry has been over the decision to allow women to serve in combat positions. As noted in my previous essay on the matter, the classic arguments were modified slightly to apply to women. To be specific, stereotypes of women were used to “argue” against allowing women in these roles and claims were made that women would destroy morale and unit cohesion.
Given what happened when blacks were allowed to serve and then integrated and what happened in the case of homosexuals, it would be reasonable to infer that the prediction that allowing women to serve in combat roles will prove just as erroneous. After all, the “reasoning” seems to be the same, only the exact target of the stereotypes and prejudices have changed.
Of course, those who argue against allowing women in combat roles can make the claim that they are not arguing from mere prejudice. After all, they can point to legitimate and established evidence that women are generally less physically capable than men. This is, of course, in contrast with the usual racist “arguments” about one race being inferior to another.
This line of reasoning does have some merit. After all, if a combat position legitimately requires abilities that women lack, then it would be wrong (practically and morally) to allow women into those positions. After all, this would truly impair the effectiveness of the unit and could result in mission failures and deaths.
However, accepting this does not require that one accepts that women should be subject to a blanket exclusion from combat positions. Individual women (and individual men) should be excluded from positions that they fail to legitimately qualify for and allowed in positions that they legitimately qualify for. Women have clearly shown that they can serve effectively in various combat roles (see Afghanistan and Iraq for recent examples). To simply exclude all women from all combat roles because some (or even all) women cannot qualify for some combat roles would certainly seem to be a mistake, both moral and practical (after all, with so many wars going we need soldiers).
When the next group is being targeted for exclusion from the military (perhaps non-humans) I am sure that the tired old arguments will be revived for yet another battle. I am also sure that someone will use the inclusion of women in combat roles as an example of how the dire sexist predictions turned out just as mistaken as the dire predictions fueled by racism.
The Future of Afghanistan
(Photo credit: Wikipedia)
While there is still a war in Afghanistan, it does not get very much attention from the media or the public. The current plan is for the United States and other nations to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. What happens after then is, of course, a matter of some concern.
Looking back on the long history of the region, the prospects for the country (to use the term somewhat loosely)do not seem to be very good, at least in terms of a functional nation emerging.
The chances of Afghanistan becoming a functional nation depends on the capability of the central government to exert authority over the country. This can be done in two ways, which were discussed by Thomas Hobbes in his classic work.
Thomas Hobbes notes that “Fellowes are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; By Constraint, when after fight the Conqueror makes the conquered serve him either through feare of death, or by laying fetters on him: By consent, when men enter into society to helpe each other, both parties consenting without any constraint.”
In terms of compulsion, even with the military might of the United States and its allies the government of Afghanistan has been unable to maintain complete control over the country. When these forces leave the government forces will be on their own. In order to predict what will happen, one must consider the likelihood that these forces will be able to not only completely replace the departing forces but also do a better job at maintaining order. This seems to be unlikely.
While the government of Afghanistan will most likely lack the power to compel those who oppose it, there is the alternative of acquiring consent. That is, getting enough of the people and groups to buy in. If this occurs, the country could stabilize enough to be considered a functional country. Looking at the current situation, it seems unlikely that those opposing the government will come around after the foreign forces depart.
The most likely scenario is that the central government will either be overcome or collapse and Afghanistan will return to the way it has been for centuries. Terrorist groups will, in all likelihood, set up bases and training camps in the region-just as they did in the past. While things will be different in many ways from when the Soviet Union departed, that period of history does provide a good indication of how things will unfold.
Naturally, things could be different this time around-but it seems likely that America will have no more success in nation building in Afghanistan than any of the predecessors had in conquering the land.
War Dead
Image by Getty Images via @daylife
There was a brief flap in the media about American marines allegedly urinating on dead Taliban fighters. Rick Perry weighed in on this as did John McCain.
On the one hand, it is easy to understand why soldiers might urinate on or otherwise desecrate the bodies of fallen foes. First, soldiers facing the sort of situation that exists in Afghanistan probably feel frustrated and angry to a degree that exceeds that felt during a more conventional war. As such, when an enemy is killed, there probably remains some desire to continue to “hurt” him. Second, getting people to be willing to kill other people already puts them in a state of mind in which they have already overcome some rather serious behavior barriers. After all, the behavioral barrier that normally prevents us from shooting other people in the head is probably a much higher moral barrier than the one that normally keeps us from urinating on the corpse of an enemy. Second, the mistreatment of the dead can be seen as part of the violence of conflict. In the past it was not uncommon for the bodies of the slain to be mutilated (sometimes in the belief that these injuries would be carried into the afterlife). As such, the desecration of the enemy is merely the continuation of the violence that began with his death.
On the other hand, this sort of behavior seems to be morally reprehensible. First, to reverse the situation, Americans were horrified when the body of U.S. Staff Sgt. William David Cleveland was dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu as people cheered and abused his remains. Given our view of this abuse of our dead, we would seem to be obligated to be consistent in our principles and thus condemn the mistreatment of the corpses of our enemies.
Second, even though the dead are most likely not hurt by this (it seems unlikely that this mistreatment somehow carries over into a metaphysical afterlife), Kant’s arguments about the treatment of animals can be modified to be used to argue against mistreating corpses.
While a corpse cannot be harmed by the abuse (the dead are presumably beyond such things), such abuse does harm to the person engaged in it and, as Kant argued, could damage their humanity and make them more inclined to act badly towards living people. As such, the dead should be treated with a reasonable degree of respect.
Of course, as noted above, if people are already killing people, then it might seem to miss the point to be nonplussed about the killing but outraged at the urination. After all, if people are already at the point where they are fine with killing, then it could be argued that they are already morally damaged to a degree that a little urination will not increase.
In reply, it can be argued that killing in the time of war is somehow consistent with treating people with respect and that a person can be both a killer and morally decent person, at least in the context of war. While this might seem to be a bit insane, experience does seem to support this. After all, while soldiers do suffer emotional trauma, most combat troops do not regard themselves as murderers and they are generally not regarded as such.
One way to make sense of this is to consider why the soldiers are killing and the typical attitude towards what they are doing. In generally, they are killing to achieve military objectives and the attitude typically does not involve a desire to murder but rather a desire to achieve the objectives (and not die) with minimal casualties (after all, most professional soldiers prefer that the enemy surrenders as opposed to fighting to the death). In the case of desecrating a corpse, this does not contribute towards achieving a legitimate military objective and it involves a degree of personal animosity that is not typical of military operations.
As a final point, there is also the moral concern of the impact of such behavior. In the case of the endless war on terror, one major objective is to win over “hearts and minds” (something that we attempted in Vietnam). Obviously enough, urinating on dead Taliban fighters is not going to help America’s image in the region (and the world) and will serve to put American forces in the region in somewhat greater danger. As such, desecrating corpses is something that should not be tolerated.
Indefinite Detainment
Image via Wikipedia
While the actual threat of terrorism is rather minor (even the worry that terrorists might obtain a nuclear weapon clearly pales beside the fact that nations are already well armed with nuclear weapons) there is still an ongoing obsession with passing laws allegedly aimed at security.
As with many attempts to (allegedly) improve security, one of the more recent approaches has involved a clear infringement on rights and liberties. To be specific, the senate recently blocked an attempt to ban the indefinite imprisonment of Americans suspected of terrorism.
The stock justifications for allowing the military to detain American indefinitely are that terrorists are bad and that to not allow this sort of thing puts us in greater danger.
While it is true that terrorists are bad, rapists and murders are also rather bad. In fact, more Americans are killed by non-terrorists than terrorists and this would seem to thus warrant indefinite detainment of all dangerous criminals. This, as might be imagined, would run contrary to the basic legal rights of Americans. As such, the idea that terrorists are bad does not seem to warrant this difference in treatments.
As far as the security value of indefinite detainment, one obvious point of concern is that in order to detain a person, they must be discovered and arrested (or captured). As such, the indefinite detainment does not seem to aid in actually capturing people. It merely allows people to be held indefinitely. While this could be justified on the grounds that a person who is detained indefinitely would do no more misdeeds, the same argument could be applied to anyone who poses a threat-which would include many non-terrorist criminals.
It might be argued that a terrorist is not entitled to the rights of a citizen since he is an enemy combatant. In the case of alleged terrorists who have allegedly elected to serve a foreign power, they could be taken to be traitors. However, the matter becomes a bit muddled when the alleged terrorist is entirely domestic in allegiance and motivations. In such cases, the person could be taken to be a traitor in the sense that he would be allegedly making war on the United States. Of course, what would be needed is a clear distinction between a terrorist and a criminal who merely intends to murder Americans and destroy things. Perhaps this could be sorted out in a clear and principled manner.
Perhaps the most significant point of concern is that an American who is accused of being a terrorist in the United States is just that-an accused terrorist. Until it is legally established that an American is a terrorist, then he is merely a suspect and thus still entitled to the full legal rights of an American citizen. In other words, if an American is taken on American soil and denied his rights because he is alleged to be a terrorist, then his rights have been violated because he has been assumed guilty without trial. If he is to be justly stripped of such rights, then his status as a terrorist must be established.
If an American is captured outside of the United States while acting as an enemy combatant (for example, he is captured during an attack on an American base in Afghanistan), then a reasonable case could be made for treating him as an enemy combatant. However, he would still be an American citizen and must be subject to the American legal system. Naturally, if an American is killed while attacking American forces in an act of war, then that death would (in general) be justified.
A final point of concern is that indefinite detainment will be misused. After all, the most common application of the various “anti-terrorist” laws has been in the area of mundane crime (mainly drug crimes). One obvious concern is that this approach could be used against people who are protesting against the government or who might be targeted for detention without trial.
It might be objected that I am “naive” and do not see “the danger.” My obvious reply is that this alleged danger does not warrant the violation of our basic legal rights. Each time someone wishes to erode rights they make these same sort of appeals to fear and “security.” While such fears might be sincere, they do not warrant an attack on the very liberties and rights they are allegedly created to defend.
Libya
Image via Wikipedia
Since being at war seems to be our natural state it is hardly surprising that our three main wars have drifted in and out of media focus. Our most recent war, Libya, seems to be going the best. While we are providing critical air power and support, the actual ground fighting is not dominated by American forces. Also, this war has been rather cheap as far as wars go-mainly because others are involved and we are not (at least not yet) dumping truckloads of cash in an attempt at “nation building.”
At this point, the rebel forces seem to be well on the path to victory. The obvious questions now are “what happens next?” and “what will the role of the United States be?” As far as what happens next, the most likely scenario is that Gadhafi will come to a bad end and the rebels will be faced with sorting out who will run the show. This might lead to another round of fighting or there might be a more peaceful solution.
The role of the United States hinges, obviously enough, on how things pan out with the rebels. So far we have followed a a fairly limited engagement strategy and have not gone the invasion route that has proved rather costly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though the situation might change, I see little advantage in having yet another invasion. Given our economy and our involvement in two other wars it would make sense to keep our involvement in Libya limited.
That said, there is the concern that the post-Gadhafi Libya might be such that the United States will need to step up its level of involvement. After all, Libya has oil and has some strategic importance. We certainly would not want, for example, the Chinese to gain too much influence in the region. Ideally, of course, the rebels will create a stable and pro-Western government. Failing that, perhaps we can get the French to take this one.
$360 Million
Have you seen this lost money?
I recently heard that the US military lost about $360 million in Afghanistan. My first thought was, of course, “at least it wasn’t billions, like in Iraq.” The money was not misplaced or left in a bathroom like a wayward umbrella. Rather it seems that it ended up being funneled through whatever passes as legitimate businesses in Afghanistan into the criminal world. Some of the money seems to have ended up in the coffers of our enemies, thus continuing our long standing tradition of funding folks who are trying to harm us (yes, I am looking at you Pakistan).
Having become cynical about such matters, I was not at all surprised by this. As noted above, I actually thought that it would be more than a mere $360 million. I do try not to think about what this wasted money could do in the United States. For example, I try not to imagine that even a modest chunk of it could have helped FAMU and FSU with their budget woes. I am accustomed to the folks “in charge” throwing away money. I resent it and use my limited capabilities to rail against it, but in the end the government folks seem incapable of preventing this sort of thing.
To be fair, perhaps this is just how things work. In the United States we have modest corruption, mainly because of our laws and traditions. Some other countries lack such laws or, if they have them, they still lack a tradition of integrity. In some cases, bribery, corruption and other criminal activities are the tradition. I would like to think better of Afghanistan, but perhaps it is essentially a criminal culture-or at least the people that we have unwisely elected to do business with are part of a criminal culture. I suspect the latter over the former.
The United States has an unfortunate history of supporting the wrong people (like the Shah of Iran) and of failing to properly control the millions and billions that we dump in other countries. While this money is tiny compared to our massive debt, these tiny drops do add to that ocean of debt. Apparently we are also bad at learning from past mistakes and seen incapable of avoiding being duped by financial criminals-our own and those in other countries. It is, to say the least, embarrassing to read about our financial idiocy.
News of the World
Image via Wikipedia
Journalists are, of course, expected to dig into things. That is an accepted part of the profession. However, there are legal and moral limits regarding how far they should go when doing such digging. The 168 year old British News of the World seems to have exceeded those limits and is being shut down by its owner, Rupert Murdoch.
To be specific, reporters who worked for the News of the World allegedly “hacked” the voice mails of around 4,000 people. What has really outraged the public is that those hacked are not just celebrities, but the families of people who have been killed by terrorists and of British soldiers who died in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps the most egregious violation is that reporters allegedly hacked the voice mail of a 13 year old girl who had been murdered. The reporters apparently even deleted voice mail messages, giving the family hope that the girl was still alive when it was not known she had been killed.
This situation, obviously enough, raises some serious ethical issues.
As noted above, journalists are expected to dig into things and this aspect of the profession can be seen as potentially justifying intrusions into privacy. The key issue is, of course, how far journalists can go in such intrusions before they are acting unethically.
One factor that can be used to assess the ethics of the intrusions is the nature of the activities being investigated. If the activities are illegal or unethical, then this would seem to justify investigation on the part of reporters, even when doing so might involves means that could be regarded as violating privacy. The moral argument here is, of course, easy and obvious: people generally have no moral or legal right to conceal their misdeeds and hence they would have little grounds to claim that they have been wronged by being exposed. To use an example, if Ted is using slaves on his Florida farm and Sally, who suspects this, sneaks onto his land to gather evidence of this, then Ted certainly has not been wronged. After all, he has no moral right to expect his keeping of slaves to go unexposed and people would seem to have a right to expose such activities.
Of course, there can be cases in which misdeeds are exposed in ways that would seem to involve unethical behavior. For example, if a reporter is snooping around a celebrity and hacks into her computer to steal private photos, then he has acted wrongly-even if his snooping reveals that she has been cheating on her taxes. Though his actions revealed a crime, his intent was not to expose such a misdeed nor did he have any reason to suspect that something illegal or immoral was occurring. As such, the reporter’s intent and justification are clearly relevant.
In the case of the News of the World, the alleged hacking does not seem to fall into the realm of ethical behavior. After all, the intent does not seem to have been to expose misdeeds or crimes. This is especially evident in the alleged hacking of the families of victims and the hacking of the murdered girl’s phone. Presumably, the reporters were looking for things to print that they could not have gotten simply by interviewing the people involved and it seems rather likely that these things were such that the reporters had no right to acquire. After all, the goal seems to have been not the revelation of misdeeds but the creation of sensational headlines and content calculated to appeal to readers. This, however, backfired and instead caused righteous indignation at these alleged violations.
There is also, of course, the fact that the reporters were hacking into voice mails, although using the default PIN hardly counts as serious hacking. While a moral argument could be made for such hacking in cases in which something truly dire was occurring, even in such cases this sort of behavior would be morally questionable (not to mention illegal). However, since the reporters were allegedly hacking for sensational information rather than engaged in exposing wickedness, they have no moral ground on which to stand. Those who directed them to such behavior and concealed their misdeeds over the years also lack such ground. After all, enabling and concealing misdeeds are themselves misdeeds.
A Philosopher's Blog 
2 comments