A Philosopher's Blog

Do We Want Rapists, Robbers and Murderers Voting?

Posted in Ethics, Philosophy, Politics by Michael LaBossiere on August 26, 2016

My essay on felons and voting received an interesting comment from A.J. McDonald, Jr. He raised a concern about having rapists, robbers and murders voting. One initial reply is that there are many other types of felonies, a significant number of which are non-violent felonies. As such, any discussion of felons and voting needs to consider not just the worst felonies, but all the felonies on the books. And, in the United States, there are many on the books. That said, I will address the specific concern about felons convicted of rape, robbery and murder.

On the face of it, it is natural to have an immediate emotional reaction to the idea of rapists, robbers and murderers voting. After all, these are presumably very bad people and it offensive to think of them exercising the same fundamental right as other citizens. While this reaction is natural, it is generally unwise to try to settle complex moral questions by appealing to an immediate emotional reaction—although calm deliberation might end up in the same place as fiery emotion. I will begin by considering arguments for disenfranchising such felons.

The most plausible argument, given my view that voting rights are foundational rights in a democratic state, is that such crimes warrant removing or at least suspending a person’s status as a citizen. After all, when a person is justly convicted of rape, murder or robbery they are justly punished by suspension of their liberty. In some cases, they are punished by death. As such, it seems reasonable to accept that if the right to liberty (and even life) can be suspended, then the right to vote can be suspended as well. I certainly see the appeal here. However, I think there is a counter to this reasoning.

Punishment by imprisonment is generally aimed at three goals. The first is to protect the public from the criminal by removing him from society and to serve as a deterrent to others.  This could be used to justify taking away the right to vote by arguing that felons are likely to vote in ways that would harm society. The easy and obvious reply is that there seems to be little reason to think that felons could do harm through voting. Or any more harm than non-felon voters. For felons to do real harm through voting, there would need to be harmful choices and these would need to be choices that felons would pick because they are felons and they would need to be able to win that vote It could be claimed that, for example, there might be a vote on reducing prison sentences and the felons would vote in their interest to the detriment of others. While this is possible, it seems unlikely that the felons would be able to win the vote on their own. There is also the obvious counter that non-felons are likely to vote in harmful ways as well—as the history of voting shows. As such, denying felons the vote to protect the public from harm is not a reasonable justification. If there are things being voted for that could do serious harm, then the danger lies with those who got such things on the ballot and not with felons who might vote for it.

The second is the actual punishment, which is typically justified in terms of retribution. This does have some appeal as a justification, assuming that the felon wants to vote and regards being denied the vote as a harm. However, most Americans do not vote—so it is not much of a punishment. There is also the question of whether the denial of the right to vote is a suitable punishment for a crime. Punishments should not simply be tossed onto a crime—they should fit. While paying restitution would fit for a robbery, being denied the right to vote would not seem to fit.

The third is rehabilitation; the prisoner is supposed to be reformed so he can be returned to society (assuming the sentence is not death or life). Denying voting rights would seem to have the opposite effect—the person would be even more disconnected from society. As such, this would not justify removal of the voting rights.

Because of these considerations, even rapists, murderers and robbers should not lose their right to vote. I do agree, as argued in my previous essay, that crimes that are effectively rejections of the criminal’s citizenship (like rebellion and treason) would warrant stripping a person of citizenship and the right to vote. Other crimes, even awful ones, would not suffice to strip away citizenship.

Another approach is to make the case that rapists, murderers and robbers are morally bad or bad decision makers and should be denied the right to vote on moral grounds. While it is true that rapists, murderers and robbers are generally very bad people, the right to vote is not grounded in being a good person (or even just not being bad) or making good (or at least not bad) decisions. While it might seem appealing to have moral and competency tests for voting, there is the obvious problem that many voters would fail such tests. Many politicians would also fail the tests as well.

It could be countered that the only test that would be used is the legal test of whether or not a person is convicted of a felony. While obviously imperfect, it could be argued that those convicted are probably guilty and probably bad people and thus should not be voting. While it is true that some innocent people will be convicted and denied the right to vote and also true that many bad people will be able to avoid convictions, this is acceptable.

A reply to this is to inquire as to why such a moral standard should be used in regards to the right to vote. After all, the right to vote (as I have argued before) is not predicated on moral goodness or competence. It is based on being a citizen, good or bad. As such, any crime that does not justly remove a citizen’s status as a citizen would not warrant removing the right to vote. Yes, this does entail that rapists, murders and robbers should retain the right to vote. This might strike some as offensive or disgusting, but these people remain citizens. If this is too offensive, then such crimes would need to be recast as acts of treason that strip away citizenship. This seems excessive. And there is the fact that there are always awful people voting—they just have not been caught or got away with their awfulness or are clever and connected enough to ensure that the awful things they do are not considered felonies or even crimes. I am just as comfortable allowing a robber to vote as I am to allow Trump and Hillary to vote in their own election.

 

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Disenfranchising

Posted in Ethics, Law, Philosophy, Politics by Michael LaBossiere on October 4, 2011
Ballot box with flag

Image by joebeone via Flickr

The right to vote is supposed to be a fundamental right in a democracy like the United States. However, denying people the right to vote has been something of an American tradition. Women were, of course, denied the right to vote until 1920. In the late 1800s Jim Crow laws were passed by southern Democrats to systematically deny blacks their voting rights. The various tactics used in these laws also sometimes excluded poor whites from voting, but steps were often taken to “correct” that problem.

Recent times have seen a significant surge of laws that would seem to have an impact on voting. The overwhelming majority of these laws have been put forth by Republicans, but Democrats have also had a role to play. These laws are typically presented as measures that are needed to counter voting fraud, although many critics contend that the sort of fraud these measures are intended to counter is extremely rare. It has been estimated that the new measures “could make it significantly harder for more than five million eligible voters to cast ballots in 2012.” As such, there seems to be a real issue here.

One point of concern is the matter of motivation. It seems likely that that the poor, the young and African-Americans will be most affected by the new laws. Since these demographics tend to vote for Democrats, it might be suspected that these laws are an attempt to disenfranchise such voters, thus reducing the likelihood that Democrats will be elected. Those supporting the laws, as noted above, claim that they are motivated solely by their desire to prevent voter fraud. Presumably, the fact that people who tend to vote for Democrats will be people most impacted by the laws is purely a matter of coincidence. I am inclined to think that the Republicans are, in fact, intending to use such laws to their political advantage. That said, the morality of an action and its consequences can be assessed independently of motives and this seems worth doing.

As noted above, the main argument for the new laws is based on the idea that they will reduce voter fraud. While it is laudable to reduce such fraud, such incidents seem to be rather rare and there is also the obvious question of whether or not the harm prevented by these laws will outweigh the harm done by these laws. After all, if voting is a very important thing, then laws that make it less likely that legitimate voters will participate in the democratic process is a matter of significant concern. Given the rarity of such fraud and the likely impact of the laws, it would seem that such laws would create more harm than good, thus making them morally dubious (at best).

One of the most widespread changes is the requirement for voters to show photo identification. Previously, only two states had this requirement. Now 34 states have such laws in the works. This is a point of concern because a large number of voters lack the identification needed. For example, South Carolina is estimated to have over 200,000 voters (8% of the total) who lack such identification.

Proponents of the laws contend, as noted above, that this requirement is needed to prevent fraud. However, the sort of fraud identification would prevent seems rare or even non-existent, hence there is the obvious question of why there is such a compelling need to implement such laws when they would most likely reduce the number of people who vote. It might, of course, be countered that it is better that  hundreds or thousands not vote than there be a single fraudulent vote cast. Of course, this can be countered that it is better for democracy that the risk of fraud be tolerated for the sake of allowing more people to exercise one of the most fundamental rights of a democracy.

It can also be contended that the requirement to show proper identification is not an onerous burden. After all, such identification is required to cash a check, to travel by air, and to operate a motor vehicle and in such cases is not considered asking too much to require identification. Also, some states plan to provide the identification people need in order to vote at no cost to the voters who need them. It can also be argued there is no compelling reason why anyone eligible to vote would be incapable of acquiring such identification with minimal effort. As such, the idea that such a requirement would wrongfully deny people the right to vote might seem absurd.

That said, given the horribly low voter turnouts, it is not unreasonable to think that there would be a significant number of voters who would simply not vote if even this additional  minor obstacle were placed in their way. As such, there is some concern that this seemingly reasonable requirement would reduce the number of people voting. However, it could be countered that while voting is a right, people should be willing to take at least some effort to exercise that right. As such, someone who is unwilling to acquire an appropriate identification has been disenfranchised, but by himself or herself and hence has no one else to blame. Naturally, if the identification requirements were burdensome, then this would be another matter.

As a final point, we should always be on guard against attempts to rob people of their right to vote. History has shown that people are quite willing to engage in this sort of misdeed and there is no reason to believe that people will not do such things again.

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